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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this aligns with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative reinforced this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This shift is major, but analysts caution it is early to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Disinterest and Strains

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable feud has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Involvement

A similar standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.